




# Lincoln Lore

Number 1899  
Spring 2012

## Sara Gabbard Interview with Frank Williams

(As mentioned in the Spring 2011 issue, we will continue each year to interview Frank Williams regarding the events which occurred 150 years ago. In this issue, we focus on 1862.)

**SG: On January 30<sup>th</sup> the first ironclad was launched. What changes did this bring to naval warfare?**



Merrimac #375

FW: Three thoughts emerge – Abraham Lincoln’s enthusiasm and support for ironclads; the tactical effect in Hampton Roads by neutralizing the destruction of Union ships by the CSS *Virginia* and the ironclad’s effect on naval vessels in particular and the advance of technology in general. President Lincoln, the only president to secure a patent (for a device to raise vessels over shoals), loved “gadgets” and saw the utility of ironclads. The *Monitor* was launched just in time, too, to stop the *Virginia* from its successful assaults on Union wooden-hull ships in Hampton Roads on March 8, 1862, and thus neutralized the offensive potential of the Confederate *Virginia*. But did the construction of ironclads really change naval warfare? The concept of ironclads ships with iron plating was not new during the Civil War, and it would take another twenty-one years for the United States Navy to develop a steel hull. However, the construction of

ironclads during the Civil War was a significant part of the technological advancements made during the conflict, including the wartime use of the telegraph, rifled and breech loading cannon, torpedoes and submarines, mines, and breech loading rifles. But the two vessels did redefine the character of naval warfare with men and officers now part of a complex self-propelled machine of war.

See Robert V. Bruce’s *Lincoln and the Tools of War* (University of Illinois Press, 1989)

**SG: On February 1, Julia Ward Howe’s “Battle Hymn of the Republic” was published in the *Atlantic Monthly*. This hymn continues to resonate today. What is the reason for its lasting influence?**



Julia Ward Howe

FW: Inspired by attending President Lincoln’s review of the Army of the Potomac at Bailey’s Crossroads, Virginia, in fall 1861, Julia Ward Howe wrote the lyrics for the *Battle Hymn of the Republic*. The poetry captured the North’s imagination as it defined the Union cause

as one of righteousness. Set to the tune of *John Brown’s Body* only enhanced its popularity. By 1864, it had become a new anthem for Unionists. As a result, the author’s popularity would remain for the rest of her life and beyond. When she died, at age 91, 4,000 mourners sang the *Battle Hymn of the Republic*. It is continually sung at funeral and other services today as it remains relevant in describing sacrifice and nation. It sings of faith in divine intervention for human justice—“Mine eyes have seen the glory of the coming of the Lord...” Even the title has a probative force. It is the most identified Civil War piece and, like its author, continues to be identified with the social reforms that followed the Civil War, including women’s suffrage, civil rights for African-Americans and the labor movement.



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## Lincoln Lore

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James H. Madison is the Thomas and Kathryn Miller Professor Emeritus of History, Indiana University, Bloomington. Jim has received several teaching awards, including the James P. Holland Award for Exemplary Teaching and the IU Student Alumni Association "Student Choice" Award.

He has also taught, as a Fulbright Professor, at Hiroshima University, Japan, and at the University of Kent, Canterbury, England. He currently serves as co-director of IU's Teaching American History Project and as a member of the Board of Indiana Humanities, a trustee of the Indiana Historical Society, and a member of the Indiana Bicentennial Commission.

Jim is the author of several books, including *Eli Lilly: A Life*; *A Lynching in the Heartland*; *Slinging Doughnuts for the Boys*; *An American Woman in World War II*; *World War II: A History in Documents*, and *The Indiana Way: A State History*.

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**Frank J. Williams** is the retired Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island and is one of the country's most renowned experts on Abraham Lincoln. He is the author or editor of over thirteen books, has contributed chapters to several others, and has lectured on the subject throughout the country. At the same time, he has amassed an unsurpassed private library and archive that ranks among the nation's largest and finest Lincoln collections. He also serves as Literary Editor of the Lincoln Herald where his *Lincolnia* appears.



**David Dew** is a retired United States History teacher from Fort Wayne, Indiana. David received his Bachelor's Degree in United States History and US Government from Ball State University and his Master's Degree from Indiana University.

photo: courtesy of Samuel Hoffman/The Journal Gazette, Fort Wayne, Ind.

**Richard W. Etulain**, Professor Emeritus of History at the University of New Mexico, is a specialist on the American West and in Abraham Lincoln studies. Of his 50 books and pamphlets, two of the most important are *LINCOLN LOOKS WEST: FROM THE MISSISSIPPI TO THE PACIFIC* (2010) and *BEYOND THE MISSOURI: THE STORY OF THE AMERICAN WEST* (2006).



**SG: Please comment on General Grant's activities in Tennessee.**

FW: In early February, Grant led two divisions up the Tennessee River against Fort Henry, but it had surrendered to the federal navy before Grant could engage. Audaciously, he moved overland to attack Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River, and on February 16, General Simon B. Buckner asked Grant for terms of capitulation. Grant insisted on "an unconditional and immediate surrender." Buckner surrendered almost 17,000 men—one of three armies to surrender to Grant during the Civil War (Pemberton at Vicksburg and Lee at Appomattox are the others). Losing the forts broke the Confederate defensive line in Kentucky, and the victory made Grant a hero in the North. With it, came his new nickname "Unconditional Surrender Grant" and promotion to major general. After the Union defeat at Manassas in July 1861 and General George B. McClellan's inability to move the Army of the Potomac, President Lincoln was ecstatic by Grant's victory. Lincoln, who had not met Grant, became an admirer even with Grant's 1862 close and costly Union victory at Shiloh. Despite complaints against Grant, the President said, "I can't spare this man; he fights."

**SG: Sometimes we focus only on the Civil War, but in 1862 Lincoln signed the Homestead Act, the Pacific Railway Acts, and the Morrill Land Grant Act. Do we fail to see this legislation as a part of Lincoln's legacy?**

FW: In 1862 Congress passed significant legislation, with President Lincoln's support, that related to land which encouraged education, settlement and migration west for white farmers and the marriage of east and west with a transcontinental railroad. Vermont Senator Justin Morrill deserves the lion's share of

credit for the act named after him to give public land to the states for education in colleges which emphasized scientific and agricultural studies. The same act created the Department of Agriculture with a commissioner to lead it. The President signed this on July 2, 1862. It did not pass without opposition, and Lincoln's support, consistent with his own rise through self-improvement, was instrumental in passage of the bill. It, like Lincoln, was a commitment to faith in the future of the nation. Likewise, the Homestead Act aided in exploiting unused tracts of land by providing that settlers could register for 160 acres of public land. Eventual title to this land was not automatic, as the homesteaders had to live on it for a minimum of five years, during which time improvements had to be made. Efforts to encourage this land use and the population required to provide the labor were thwarted by many Southern leaders who feared free labor with small landholdings. President James Buchanan had vetoed an earlier version of homestead legislation. Despite the Civil War, or because of it, this was part of the sweeping reform measures of the Lincoln administration that should be remembered. The Homestead Act of 1862 had great implications, politically as well as pragmatically.


Southerners feared that their own land would be confiscated and delivered-over to former slaves. As it turned out, the grant of large land holdings to states and the railroads acted to diminish such development by small farmers.

Railroads, following their expansive growth in the 1850s, helped win the war for the federal government. During the war the federalization of the North's railroads as the United States Military Railroad was a towering presence and assistance to the federal armies. Plans for a transcontinental railroad, the "Golden Spike" would eventually be driven in 1869, were

essential for the country's rail system. Cooperation among separate rail lines, operation of long distant routes, along with logistical challenges to deliver massive numbers of people and supplies led to a continental network that helped make the United States a world power. Burdened with military and political challenges, President Lincoln, by correctly recognizing their value to the country, can rightly place these reforms in his resumé.

**SG: When he issued the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation in September 1862, did President Lincoln really expect that the states "now in rebellion" would comply with his terms?**

FW: The preliminary proclamation of emancipation was issued, in part, to comply with the second Confiscation Act passed on July 17, 1862, which directed Southerners "to cease participating in aiding, countenancing, or abetting the existing rebellion" within 60 days or their slaves would be freed. This edict was to expire the day after the President issued his preliminary proclamation. Lincoln included this section of the Confiscation Act giving those in rebellion until January 1, 1863, to cease fighting. Rebellious states now had another three months to cease their insurrection and return to the union with slavery intact.



1869-Train carrying railway officials to "Golden Spike" ceremony  
LOC-NV9-CF26-9

Rather than any genuine belief that these Confederate states would do so, Lincoln was appealing more to Northerners by offering an early end to the war, especially with the growing number of casualties.

He also continued his quest for compensated emancipation to the states and slave owners, as well as colonization of free blacks. The Confederate States, not surprisingly, refused to return to the union, but arguably Lincoln's effort at reunion impressed Northern voters. Despite losing 34 seats in the House of Representatives, the legislatures in Illinois and Indiana, as well as the governorships in New York and New Jersey, they were the smallest election losses in off-year elections in twenty years. President Lincoln would continue to look for ways to end the war and to affect his new emancipation policy now that the war's aim was changed from reunion to reunion and emancipation.

**SG: Were radical abolitionists angry that in the Proclamation he effectively by-passed requirements which would apply to the Border States?**

FW: Actually, many understood the President's limitations and believed the war had now changed with the end of slavery as a goal, as well as reunion. The radicals and abolitionists knew that they had succeeded in pushing the President toward emancipation with congressional passage of two confiscation acts and other legislation prohibiting slavery in the territories, the District of Columbia and freedom for those slaves escaping to Federal lines.

While the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation fell short of anti-slavery proponents as it would only apply to areas still in Confederate control, the radicals and abolitionists knew that for slavery, it was the beginning of the end. Even Ben Wade shouted, "Hurrah for Old Abe and the proclamation."

And Senator Charles Sumner delivered a speech in its praise.

With President Lincoln committed to gradual compensated emancipation, colonization and concern about offending the border states which continued after the proclamation, it is doubtful whether he would have issued the proclamation without prodding from the radicals.

With the dismissal of conservative General George B. McClellan six weeks after the proclamation, it was evident that the war aims of Lincoln and the radicals were similar.

**SG: "Meditation on the Divine Will" was written in early September 1862. I know that some of the thoughts were eventually included in the Second Inaugural. Was Lincoln simply jotting down private thoughts at random, or do you think that he was planning to use the particular wording sometime in the future?**

FW: As an autodidact, Lincoln's notes were a way for him to think about problems and define issues privately. He did this all his life, whether to describe the practice of law, discuss slavery or, in this case, the presence of God in the Civil War. While they may have been random, he was not above using these private thoughts publicly in the future. As a politician, was he using religion in his speeches because it would be endearing to a church-going America? This memorandum was intended to be confidential and represented his brooding over the very real war with its pain and losses. As Lincoln biographer Ronald White, Jr. said, "Lincoln's meditation is about a God who acts in history."

**SG: We know that the battle of Antietam gave Lincoln the victory needed to issue the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation. Please comment on the battle itself.**



Prang, Battle of Antietam #4479

FW: The battle of Antietam near Sharpsburg, Maryland, on September 17, 1862, was America's bloodiest day with over 26,000 casualties. While considered a union victory because Lee retreated back to Virginia after the battle, it proved the ineptitude and lack of aggression by General George B. McClellan, who had vastly superior numbers when compared to the forces available to General Robert E. Lee. Even though McClellan had a copy of Lee's order with the disposition of Confederate units before the battle, he still failed to act and attack them before they united. When they did unite, he failed to attack them simultaneously and fought them piecemeal. To make matters worse, he failed to commit his reserve of 20,000 troops for his fear of Lee's phantom divisions. McClellan's failure once again to follow-up with attacks against Lee's forces led the President to finally fire him. McClellan would be the Democratic candidate against Lincoln in the 1864 election but not before efforts to neutralize him politically with another offer of command was made by Francis Preston Blair with the knowledge of Lincoln and General in Chief Ulysses S. Grant. McClellan, who could not abide the administration's policy of emancipation, refused.

**SG: Henry David Thoreau died in 1862. Please comment on his influence on the abolitionist movement.**

FW: Henry David Thoreau (July 12, 1817-May 6, 1862) received his fame following his death. During his life, he was thought of primarily as a naturalist. Now, he is considered a major American literary figure and important political influence with *Walden* and "Civil Disobedience" which influenced Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. and Mahatma Gandhi. Less remembered is his support for escaped slave Anthony Burns and his denunciation of Massachusetts for its failure to rescue Burns published in his "Slavery in Massachusetts," and for his support of John Brown after his failed attack on the Harpers Ferry arsenal in order to obtain weapons for the abolitionist cause.



Henry David Thoreau  
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Thoreau was one of the first to defend him and wrote "Plea for Capt. John Brown" which he first delivered in Concord, Massachusetts, and then again in Boston and Worcester. While most abolitionists denounced Brown's failed attack as "misguided" or "insane," Thoreau saw him as a true Transcendentalist who was willing to give up his life for his principles. Many were won over by Thoreau's eloquence, and his "Plea" received wide circulation when it was included in James Redpath's bestselling *Echoes of Harper's Ferry* (1860).

**SG: Please explain the circumstances in July which led the Cabinet to recommend that the Proclamation not be issued until after a Union victory. Did Lincoln readily or reluctantly agree with that recommendation?**

FW: The President signed the second Confiscation Act in July 1862, believing that the President, rather than Congress, had the war power to emancipate slaves. The Act mandated freedom of slaves of owners still in rebellion after sixty days. Lincoln then met with his cabinet to inform them of his decision to issue the proclamation. The purpose of this announcement was not to solicit their advice, but he received plenty. Only Attorney General Edward Bates was ecstatic, but he desired colonization for free blacks and former slaves. Secretary of the Treasury Salmon P. Chase surprisingly demurred, as he feared emancipation would adversely affect an already tenuous financial situation in the country. Secretary of State William Seward worried about foreign recognition in need of the South's cotton and that the issuance of the proclamation at that time, without Union success on the battlefield, would appear to be a last gasp of a desperate government. Lincoln, who was planning to issue the proclamation the next day was convinced with this last argument and decided to hold the document until a Union victory.

**SG: Lincoln's Annual Message to Congress on December 1, 1862: How was it received by Congress? By the media? In your opinion, what was the President trying to accomplish with the speech? Did he succeed?**

FW: It was a strange document. While almost half of it related to African Americans and praising America, it said almost nothing on the progress of the war or the impending final Emancipation Proclamation that would take effect on January 1, 1863. Some congressman did complain. Lincoln's commitment to gradual compensated

emancipation and colonization was stressed in the message. He asked Congress to authorize funds for colonization and payments to states that provided emancipation by 1900. Loyal owners of slaves would also be compensated if their slaves were freed. The proposal actually negated parts of the Emancipation Proclamation. It was a last ditch offer to the border and Confederate states with a different approach to freedom without immediate emancipation. His plan would provide for government issued bonds to be paid when slavery ended in a state. Yet, his peroration received great praise in the media.

*The dogmas of the quiet past, are inadequate for the stormy present. . .As our case is new so we must think anew, and act anew. We must disenthrall ourselves and then we shall save our country. . .*

These eloquent words remain among the best of any American president.

**SG: Was the Gatling gun first used in 1862? How did it change warfare?**


FW: The 1862 Gatling gun, despite early design problems, is the most recognizable weapon of the Civil War. Yet, it saw little use during the war. Only later models met with acceptance by the army. The 1862 model consisted of six rifled barrels revolving around a central axis that was turned by a hand crank. The gun was mounted on an artillery-type carriage. Major general Benjamin Butler ordered twelve weapons and carriages with 12,000 rounds of ammunition, but it is not clear if he ever employed them in combat.



Gatling Gun LFC #375

# 1862 timeline

In addition to the material covered in the interview with Frank Williams and Civil War battles too numerous to mention, there were other notable events in 1862.



**Also in 1862:** John D. Rockefeller invested \$4,000 in his first oil refinery ■ In Nevada, Samuel Clemens became a reporter, using the pen name Mark Twain ■ Actress Sarah Bernhardt made her first acting debut in Paris ■ Author Louisa May Alcott spent the winter in DC, serving as a nurse for wounded soldiers. She became ill and was given a drug which made her a semi-invalid. She remained in that state for the remaining 20 years of her life ■ Mary Jane Patterson received a degree from Oberlin College in Ohio. She was the first black female to graduate in the US.

**June 19:**

President Lincoln signed a bill which prohibited slavery in US territories

**July 4:**

On a boat trip, Oxford mathematician Charles Dodgson told Alice Liddell that he would make up a story called Alice's Adventures Underground for her. Under the name Lewis Carroll, he would share this story with the world as Alice in Wonderland

**August 18:**

Beginning of the "Sioux Uprising" in Minnesota

**July 24:**

Former President Martin Van Buren died

Sioux uprising



**August 30:**

Second Battle of Bull Run (Manassas), ended on August 30 with a victory by Confederate forces



Magnus 2<sup>nd</sup> Battle of Bull Run LFFC #

**September 11:**

William Sydney Porter was born. He would write under the pen name of O Henry as a tribute to French chemist Ossian Henry.

K&A Antietam  
71.2009.084.07304h

**September 22:**

As a result of the Union victory at Antietam on September 17, President Lincoln issued the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation



**October 4:**

Edward Stratemeyer was born. He would create the Hardy boys, the Rover boys, Nancy Drew and the Bobbsey Twins.

**November 5:**

President Lincoln relieved General George McClellan of command of the Army of the Potomac and replaced him with General Ambrose Burnside

**December 1:**

Ending of Lincoln's annual Message to Congress: Fellow citizens, we cannot escape history. We of this Congress and this administration will be remembered in spite of ourselves.

No personal significance, or insignificance, can spare one or another of us. The fiery trial through which we pass will light us down, in honor or dishonor, to the latest generation....In giving freedom to the slave, we assure freedom to the free---honorable alike in what we give, and what we preserve. We shall nobly save, or meanly lose, the last best, hope of earth....The way is plain, peaceful, generous, just ---a way which, if followed, the world will forever applaud, and God must forever bless.



Burnside  
OC-0466



McClellan  
OC-0800

## Book review of

## **AMERICA AFLAME: How the Civil War Created a Nation** by David Goldfield

(New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2001)  
*Reviewed by David Dew*

As much as we would like succinct, logical reasons behind the occurrence of events, history is far more complicated to explain and understand. Perceptions are taken as reality, good intentions often lead to unintended consequences, prejudice collides with reason, and moral absolutes inhibit compromise. These seem to be some of the lessons that might be gleaned from *America Aflame: How the Civil War Created a Nation*.

The author, Dr. David Goldfield, is the Robert Lee Bailey Professor of History at the University of North Carolina at Charlotte and has written and collaborated on a number of books about the South. In his introduction to *America Aflame*, he wonders if anything new can be written about the Civil War. Nevertheless, Dr. Goldfield declares that he is trying to give the reader a new perspective on the war and he provocatively proclaims that "the Civil War is...America's greatest failure." Immediately, that statement challenges the reader and many people who would view the war in much more positive terms as the event that saved the Union, freed the slaves, and established that the U.S. was more than a confederation of sovereign states.

By way of argument, Dr. Goldfield submits that the war was NOT inevitable. He points out that the war cost \$6.8 billion, and that if the slaves had been purchased from their masters and each provided with a 40-acre farm, the cost would have been \$3.1 billion, leaving—theoretically—\$3.7 billion to apply as reparations for lost wages and profits. However, the

real "cost" of the war was the blood of more than 600,000 Americans who died as the result of: the bumbling of mediocre politicians; differing interpretations on how to preserve the ideals of the Revolutionary forefathers; the pressure of westward expansion; the "divine right" of Manifest Destiny; the perception of America's special place in the world as the leading democracy; the fracturing of political parties; the self-assumed moral superiority among various groups of Americans; the racial stereotyping; the economic sectional self-interests; and, most interestingly, the rise of evangelical Christianity. Dr. Goldfield's position is that "the political system could not contain the passions" generated by those cultural, economic, and political forces. Issues of the time (and all sectional issues, says Dr. Goldfield, were connected to slavery) confounded attempts for peaceful solutions and led to unprecedented violence, and that was failure within a country that saw itself as a "beacon" for democracy and as a "chosen" nation unique in the world.

Dr. Goldfield has written an epic history. It covers the time period roughly from the 1830s to the end of Reconstruction, or "Redemption" as the South might call it. He does not re-fight the political and military battles of the era in tactical detail as much as he attempts to trace the dynamic cultural and ideological forces that drove those battles and the transforming influence those forces had on America. The Civil War, states Dr. Goldfield, becomes a dividing line that may have completed the American Revolution (that might be debatable) and formed the beginning of a modern nation.

This book obviously is the product of years of thought and research. It is thoroughly notated and backed by an extensive bibliography.

There is understated humor as when James Buchanan is described as "a well-preserved mummy" and there are graphic moments of transformation as when Confederate soldier, Sam Watkins, visited a wounded comrade after Shiloh and discovered that his friend was covered in maggots and nearly cut in half. "...I kissed him in his lips and forehead, and left," Watkins related. Men who marched to war for some glorious cause would find little glory in the fighting of that war.



Harriett Beecher Stowe, 1811-1896  
Library of Congress. LC - USZ62-11212



Uncle Tom's Cabin.  
Library of Congress. LC-USZC4-10315

Dr. Goldfield has richly illustrated the time period with numerous quotes and anecdotes from both the famous and not-so-famous to reveal the temper and contemporary perceptions 19th Century Americans had of the momentous events engulfing the era. For instance, 32-year-old Sullivan Ballou of Rhode Island wrote his wife on the eve of 1st Bull Run putting himself in God's will, declaring his willingness to die for his country, acknowledging the debt owed to those of the Revolution, and how "...American Civilization now leans upon the triumph of the government..." Saying he's perfectly willing "to lay down all...joys in this life...to maintain this government." Sullivan Ballou died at 1st Bull Run.

Sullivan Ballou's story is one example Dr. Goldfield uses to cogently illustrate some of the forces shaping the Civil War and its consequences. For many, America's special place in the world was at stake, and the war would complete the vision of the Revolutionary legacy, thereby demonstrating that the United States was a "chosen nation" under God. The 2<sup>nd</sup> Great Awakening of the early 1800s and the rise of evangelical Christianity espoused a "higher law" (articulated by William Seward, by the way), and the response to this "higher law" and to the "saving" of the nation were of greater import than the desires of the individual.




Abraham Lincoln delivering his second inaugural address. Library of Congress. LC-DIG-ppmsca-23718

And, interestingly enough, both Northern and Southern soldiers believed much the same thing, Dr. Goldfield asserts. While Northern soldiers fought to preserve the Union forged by the Revolution, Southern soldiers were upholding the Revolution by fighting an oppressive government. While to the North, freeing the slave would complete the promise of the Declaration, to the South, fighting to preserve property rights and the protection of home upheld the same Declaration and the Constitution. Both sides prayed to the same God, as Abraham Lincoln noted in his Second Inaugural Address, and both sides believed they were fighting for the Revolutionary legacy, and both sides believed that God was on their side.

Quite possibly, where this book breaks new ground and re-interprets the fundamental forces that caused the Civil War is Dr. Goldfield's emphasis on the rise of evangelical Christianity. Influenced by this evangelical movement fostered by the 2<sup>nd</sup> Great Awakening, the post-Revolutionary generations of Americans redefined their nation, not in terms of building a stronger Union, but rather, in terms of reforming society in a context of "good" versus "evil." This evangelical movement, postulates Dr. Goldfield, polarized the debates over issues into "absolute" terms. Slavery, for instance, became a test of America's religious and democratic ideals. Were "all men created equal" or should property rights be protected? Compromise, therefore, became difficult while moral absolutes, pride, perceived honor, economic well-being, and

face-saving were tangled into the debates of every issue. Fifty congressmen got into a fistfight during the debate on Kansas' Lecompton Constitution. While both North and South believed they were preserving the legacy of their forefathers, they had lost sight of the rationality and sense of compromise for the sake of national unity of earlier generations.



The first Battle of Bull Run, Va. July 21, 1861  
Library of Congress. LC-DIG-pga-0035

Dr. Goldfield traces the pressures of the westward movement on the growing disconnect between the North and South. Building on the evangelical influence, the westward movement becomes more than just a search for new opportunities. It becomes a "manifest destiny," an almost God-given destiny, through which America will make the world a better place. And, paradoxically, while marching to this "calling," neither Mexican nor Native American would be allowed to stand in the way. Reforming society did not necessarily mean recognizing racial equality, Dr. Goldfield points out. While the victory in the Mexican War would confirm to Americans that the United States held a special place on the world stage, it would also test the ability of Americans to agree on the future of slavery.

The North saw the South as a "slave power conspiracy" from which America must be cleansed; while the South worried that it would not be treated equitably by an increasingly dominant North and, therefore, sought to preserve the concept of states' rights. The Dred Scott decision made slavery a national issue threatening America's moral position in the North and that of protecting the individual's right to private property in the South. Dr. Goldfield believes the Compromise of 1850 was the last gasp of those who tried to save the Union. After that, the nation spiraled into the "failure" called the Civil War. The Lincoln-Douglas Debates illustrated irreconcilable differences. Bleeding Kansas and John Brown's Raid on Harper's Ferry furthered the estrangement between North and South. Violence increasingly became the tactic choice for each side.

If there is a narrator in Dr. Goldfield's history, it is Walt Whitman who is used as a "commentator" on the events throughout the book. Initially, Whitman welcomed the war as a chance to cleanse America, but he comes to hate it as he nurses the broken and shattered casualties of the war.



Walt Whitman.  
Library of Congress.  
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The failure of the antebellum generations to put aside the certitude of their positions resulted


in a payment in blood far greater than anyone had dared imagine. Confederate Sam Watkins described the Battle of Franklin, "O, my God! What did we see! It was a giant holocaust of death." Confederate General Patrick Cleburne died at Franklin after being struck by 49 bullets.

That horror of war transformed the period of Reconstruction, according to Dr. Goldfield. Restoration of the Union spurred Northern nationalism, but Northerners wanted to put the war and all of its horrors behind them. The South was beaten, but Southern hearts were unchanged and Southerners wanted to "redeem" the Old South and invented a "romantic" image of antebellum Southern society that was largely illusory. "Redeeming" the Old South included keeping the freedman in his place. America, Dr. Goldfield states, entered its own "Age of Reason" with science replacing God and moral crusades as the basis of public policy. Technology might "perfect" America if moral crusades could not.

The author indicates that America's concern shifted during the Reconstruction years toward building the national prosperity, rather than ensuring equal rights. There were contradictions in the post-war era, declares Dr. Goldfield. Slavery was ended, but the place of the freedman was unsettled. There was a growing national prosperity, but the South would become increasingly isolated. Unintended consequences emerged after the Civil War. The Federal government had become more powerful, but "big government" became synonymous with corruption in the minds of many citizens. Many came to believe that less government would lead to less corruption. The Radical Republicans attempted to create an "egalitarian" society in the South, but eight out of eleven Northern states defeated Black suffrage referendums. Southerners were not interested in

being remade, and Northerners, feeling that they had done enough during the war, were ignorant or apathetic about Black rights. Dr. Goldfield relates the mass murder of freedmen in the little-known Colfax Massacre in Louisiana and the Hamburg Butchery in South Carolina as off-shoots of the Southern attempt to build the "Old South." And, in response, the Northerners simply seemed uninterested. Harriet Beecher Stowe, riding the wave of evangelical Christianity, had molded Northern perception of slavery by writing *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, but, after the war, ended up selling Florida real estate and came to believe the freedman was only "fit" for manual labor.

The nation turned from pursuing great moral issues to the pursuit of happiness, and, in most cases, that meant the pursuit of money. The building of the transcontinental railroad unified the country east and west, but by turning the country's focus to the west, the South became more isolated. The South waged a 2<sup>nd</sup> War of Independence to take back white power and sought redemption through retrenchment, the passage of Black Codes, and the rise of white supremacy groups. The Compromise of 1877 made Rutherford Hayes president while it withdrew Federal troops from the South. Short of its goals, the great "social and political revolution" that was called Reconstruction ended there, Dr. Goldfield declares.



Rutherford B. Hayes  
Library of Congress  
LC-USZ62-64279

But, despite the enormous expenditure of blood in the Civil War and the apparent "failure" of Reconstruction to achieve egalitarian goals, the re-constituted nation was one that is recognizable to 21<sup>st</sup> Century Americans. Government supported big business, an income tax had been used, a national currency introduced, and high finance and entrepreneurship drove the economy. Furthermore, a middle class was emerging; people developed leisure-time activities; oil was an important new commodity; and technology was celebrated. The emerging nation, Dr. Goldfield points out, was not all inclusive. There were still anti-Catholic and anti-immigrant feelings; women were agitating for inclusion in the political process; and the promises to the freedmen seemed tragically pushed aside. Dr. Goldfield argues, nevertheless, that the Civil War could very well mark the beginning of modern America. And, although the war did not establish equality for all groups, he believes the Civil War kept the American ideal of the Declaration alive for the 20<sup>th</sup> century and beyond. World War II would spark a re-evaluation of the illusion of the "romantic" South and would spawn new movements promoting the rights of minorities and women.


Dr. David Goldfield has written a panoramic and important history lesson. It is an intricate study that weaves together all the feelings, emotions, perceptions, movements, attitudes, and events that molded the evolution of 19<sup>th</sup> Century America. The book challenges our simple explanations for the sequence of historical events by demonstrating that history does not always follow simple and logical paths. The events created "a new nation as a mighty machine powering prosperity." This book also portrays a nation pursuing

progress while struggling, at times, with a disconnect between its ideals and the living reality for many people. One might debate that the Civil War completed the Revolution because the United States is still an experiment in progress. But, Dr. Goldfield's assertion that the Civil War marked the beginning of a modern nation is compelling. While he viewed the giant Corliss steam engine at the Philadelphia Centennial Exposition in 1876, Walt Whitman saw the promise of a nation entering an era of "untrammelled progress."

This book is well-written and well-documented. It is how history ought to be taught with all its triumphs and failures. Reality often does not drive the human drama so much as the perception of reality.

While Dr. Goldfield has written a history of the events of the 19<sup>th</sup> Century, the reader is pushed to wonder if that history serves as a mirror to the 21<sup>st</sup> Century? Do the "religious, conservative right" and the "liberal left" clutch to their ideologies with such certitude that any spirit of compromise and unity is precluded? Do beliefs in a "higher law" and protection of rights on both sides prevent rational discussion on issues like abortion? Are politicians driven more for the possession of elected office that results in lip-service to national values, rather than to true service in a spirit of statesmanship? Do perceptions of corporate greed (whether true or not) or of a flawed political system (whether true or not) promote cynicism in the public mind that erodes a national confidence and involvement by the citizenry? Given the history of delayed rights, is it difficult for minorities to feel connected to the well-being of their own country? These and other questions could be asked. Dr. Goldfield has given us valuable insights into the development of the American character and national system.

He succeeds in trying to give the reader a new perspective on the Civil War. *America Aflame: How the Civil War Created a Nation* is recommended reading for an understanding of the United States for all its promise, its triumphs, its thought, its backtracking, and its growth.



*Corliss Engine  
LC-HAER PR,39-BOCA,1-10*



*President Lyndon Johnson signing  
the 1968 Civil Rights Bill  
Warren K. Leffler, photographer  
LC-U9-18985-18A*



*Suffragettes, ca. 1910  
Bain News Service  
LC-DIG-ggbain-13739*

## LINCOLN AND THE OREGON COUNTRY

### by Richard Etulain

Abraham Lincoln's expanding interest in the Oregon Country reveals much about our greatest president. Those Lincoln links also enlarge the significance of the Far West as part of the Civil War era. Unfortunately, previous historians and biographers have paid scant attention to both subjects.

Lincoln became more cognizant of Oregon and California areas when national politics—particularly the possible expansion of slavery and economic developments—caught his attention. When four of Lincoln's friends moved to Oregon in the 1850s, his connections with the region dramatically expanded. Then, when he assumed the presidency in 1861, Lincoln was forced in the next four years to deal more specifically with the Oregon Country (Oregon, Washington, Idaho, and Montana), especially its political organization. Seen whole, Lincoln's links with the Far Corner of the U. S. are moments of illumination for understanding his leadership and the expansion of the Pacific Northwest.<sup>1</sup>

Lincoln's insular family experiences, his inadequate formal education, and his initial political allegiances circumscribed his early acquaintance with the American West. Although his three states of residence—Kentucky, Indiana, and Illinois—were considered part of "the West" in Lincoln's early years (1809-1831), he knew little about the trans-Mississippi West.

Revealingly, Lincoln's long-time political rival in Illinois, Stephen A. Douglas, emerged as an enthusiastic cheerleader for western expansion much earlier than Lincoln. As a Democratic legislator in Illinois (1836-1837), member of the U.S. House of Representatives (1843-1847), and then a U.S. senator (1847-1861), Douglas often stood in the vanguard of political leaders calling for the development of the West. Serving as chair of the territorial committees in both the House and Senate, Douglas formulated and led these expansionistic policies. Lincoln was much slower to sense the growing importance of the West in America's future.<sup>2</sup>

A few minor documents in the early 1840s mention Lincoln's links with Oregon. As early as 1843, he is listed as attending meetings in Illinois concerning the "Oregon question."<sup>3</sup> Then, as news of settlers heading up the Oregon Trail

rang across the Illinois prairies, the election of 1844 fired up debates over expansion, and the Joint Occupation of Oregon moved to center stage, Lincoln cast half a glance toward Oregon. In a speech in July 1846, he dealt with "the Oregon question," as well as the Mexican-American War and the annexation of Texas, the latter of which occurred the previous year.<sup>4</sup> But Lincoln's position on Oregon was not very clear. One Illinois newspaper urged Lincoln to be more forthright on the British-American competition for the Oregon Country, especially after it became clear that he planned to run for U.S. Congress. Was he "for 54 4[0], or [was he] for 'compromising' away our Oregon territory to England." .... No shuffling, Mr. Lincoln? Come out, square.<sup>5</sup>

By the time Lincoln arrived to take his seat in the House of Representatives in December 1847, the Mexican-American War had been underway for nineteen months, with most of the bloody battles in the past. Lincoln's strong opposition to the war and his attacks on Democratic President James K. Polk



James K. Polk

in December 1847-January 1848 stirred up and divided Whigs in Illinois. More important, however, for Lincoln's links with the Oregon Country were the events of the following August.<sup>6</sup>

In the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ended the Mexican-American War in February 1848, the U.S. gained California, Arizona, New Mexico, and immediately adjacent areas. Even before the ink on the treaty was dry, Congress began intense debates on the issue of slavery in the newly acquired areas. In a simultaneous but separate issue, Congress took under consideration Oregon's request for territorial status, which President Polk had been advocating for some time. The two separate issues—slavery or no slavery in lands taken from Mexico and Oregon as a new territory—were conjoined in the larger debate over slavery and its expansion. When these contested topics came before Congress in midsummer 1848, Abraham Lincoln

voted often on these issues. Those votes in July and August 1848 forged Lincoln's first close connection with the Oregon Country.

Most of all, Lincoln's earliest decisions about Oregon revealed his positions on slavery. When the House passed bills in 1848 authorizing territorial government for Oregon but also extending the Missouri Compromise line of 1820 to the West Coast, Lincoln voted against the legislation. But when Congressional bills passed calling for Oregon's territorial organization included the antislavery stipulations of the Ordinance of 1787 (or Northwest Ordinance), Lincoln supported the measures. Not all of Lincoln's votes on Oregon or on the possibility of territorial status for California and New Mexico are clear, but what is manifest is his support of legislation keeping slavery out of Oregon, and, as much as possible, the remainder of the West. A half dozen years later with more than a little hyperbole, Lincoln told his close friend Joshua Speed, "When I was in Washington I voted for the Wilmot Proviso as good as forty times....I now do no more than oppose the extension of slavery."<sup>7</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

As Lincoln ended his two years in Congress in March 1849, he became embroiled in a sticky competition for a federal position before being offered two appointments in Oregon. After a slow start in the contest for commissioner of the General Land Office, Lincoln threw himself enthusiastically into the competition. Stiff and acrimonious rivalry ensued, with Lincoln losing out to Justin Butterfield, an Illinois lawyer less involved than Lincoln in the election of 1848 that brought Whig Zachary Taylor into the White House. Lincoln was deeply—if not bitterly—disappointed with the outcome.

In the midst of Lincoln's upset, an unexpected telegram in August arrived in Springfield from Washington, D. C.



Zachary Taylor  
OC-1797

It offered Lincoln appointment as secretary of the territory of Oregon, exactly one year after he supported legislation organizing the new territory. The telegram from Secretary of State John M. Clayton tendering Lincoln the position of territorial secretary of Oregon at a salary of \$1,500 was unusual because Lincoln had not been nominated for the post and had not expected it. Perhaps the Taylor administration was compensating Lincoln for his loss in the bitter battle for commissioner of the General Land Office. At any rate, Lincoln quickly rejected the offer. One month later another telegram came from Washington. This time the invitation, coming from Secretary of the Interior Thomas Ewing, was for the governorship of Oregon at a salary of \$3,000.<sup>8</sup>

Lincoln never said much about the offer, but he evidently talked about it to several colleagues and close friends. Two of Lincoln's law partners—John Todd Stuart and William Herndon



Herndon  
LN-0718



John Todd Stuart  
LN-0330

contended that he seriously thought of accepting the position. These acquaintances and friends pointed to two other matters that probably determined Lincoln's negative decision. Mary did not want to go to a distant West far removed from her family and friends. She may also have feared the possible illness of her boys (they were sick a good deal; in fact, three-year old Eddie Lincoln died less than a year later in February 1850), and she may have believed rumors of threatening Indians in Oregon. Quite possibly, politics and

Lincoln's political future may have been more of a determining factor. Oregon was a Democratic territory, so what political future, as a Whig, would Lincoln have in Oregon? True, he might have a run at a senatorial seat if Oregon quickly became a state, but how long would that take in an area safely in the Democratic camp? Whatever the determining reasons, Lincoln decided against the second offer and turned back to his Illinois law practice and national politics.<sup>9</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

The next dozen years of Lincoln's career—and his political and personal connections with Oregon and the American West—divide into two periods. In the five years following his congressional stint, Lincoln returned to his law office and diligently expanded his Illinois legal practice. Although he claimed later that he "was losing interest in politics" during these years, he remained involved in both local and national political activities.<sup>10</sup>

But Lincoln was not as involved in the whirligig of American politics as he had been in the late 1840s. That all changed when the Kansas-Nebraska bill firestorm exploded onto the scene in 1854. Once out front as a leading anti-Nebraska man by the close of that year, Lincoln stayed on stage—and increasingly so—in the next seven years leading to his presidency in 1861. These mounting events also tied Lincoln more closely to ideas that would profoundly shape the political contours of Oregon in the next dozen years.<sup>11</sup>

Lincoln's long-time nemesis, Illinois Democrat Stephen Douglas, ignited the firestorm in 1854. Perhaps driven by political ambition, pecuniary advancement, and the need to find a middle point between southern and northern political partisans, Douglas introduced legislation in 1854 that would repeal the Missouri Compromise of 1820 and allow westerners to make their own decisions (popular sovereignty) on slavery issues. Keeping quiet while diligently researching the history of popular sovereignty versus federal government disallowance of slavery, Lincoln in the late summer of 1854 turned evangelist to travel throughout Illinois preaching against popular sovereignty. No presentation was more path-breaking than Lincoln's three-hour speech in Peoria, blasting Douglas's ideas, calling slavery "a great moral wrong," and dismissing as a "lullaby" Douglas's contention that

slavery would never succeed in Kansas and Nebraska.<sup>12</sup>

Lincoln's emphases in the Peoria speech persisted throughout the second half of the 1850s. He spoke repeatedly against popular sovereignty, for the no-extension principle, and increasingly pointed to the moral wrongs of the institution of slavery. These political stances were also at the center of Lincoln's presentations in the titanic debates with Douglas in summer and fall of 1858. Douglas attempted to paint Lincoln and his Republicans as



Debates  
#175

"Negro lovers," and, in turn, Lincoln portrayed Douglas as an inhumane pragmatist, choosing to be blind to the immorality of slavery and disinterested in the natural rights of African Americans. The debaters did not want to deal with the complexities of either their opponent's positions, or their own.

The major issues in the Lincoln-Douglas debates in Illinois were precisely the issues Oregon dealt with in moving toward statehood. The positions of most Oregon voters mirrored much of what Lincoln stated or implied in his debates. Oregonians, in supporting a new state constitution in 1857, voted 7,727 to 2,645 to reject slavery but even more decisively—8,640 to 1,081—to exclude free Negroes from the new state. These antislavery and some of anti-Negro stances were those that Lincoln spoke for in 1858. To the consternation of modern civil rights advocates, Lincoln did not at this time move toward freedom for all blacks and certainly not voting rights for them. The Emancipation Proclamation and calling for voting rights for select blacks was five to six years in the future, after Lincoln was in the White House and under the back-breaking load of winning the Civil War.<sup>13</sup>

\* \* \* \* \*

Even though Lincoln forestalled stronger ties with Oregon in 1849 by rejecting offers to become its territorial secretary or governor, he became more closely linked to the new territory when several close friends moved to Oregon between 1849 and 1860. Among those Illinois residents immigrating to Oregon were four of Lincoln's friends: David Logan, Dr. Anson G. Henry, Simeon Francis, and Edward D. Baker. All clearly linked Lincoln politically to Oregon.<sup>14</sup>

David Logan, the son of Lincoln's second law partner Stephen Trigg Logan, arrived in Lafayette, Oregon, in 1849. Logan quickly assumed leadership among the Whigs and later the Republicans of Oregon. He was elected to the territorial legislature in 1854 and 1857 and also became a delegate to the Oregon constitutional convention in 1857. Even though a superb lawyer, an inspiring speaker, and a person with a first-rate legal mind, Logan's alcoholism, rumored immoral behavior, and his tendency to clash vociferously with opponents undermined his lifelong dream of winning a seat in the U.S. Congress.<sup>15</sup> After speaking for Lincoln and furthering the Whig and Republican causes in Oregon, Logan expected a patronage appointment after Lincoln's election in 1860. He wrote the president about his desires, but Lincoln never answered, perhaps put off by Logan's negative reputation and his tendency to oppose fellow Republicans who did not agree with his political stances.<sup>16</sup>

The most lively personally—and rabid politically—of Lincoln's acquaintances in Oregon was Dr. Anson G. Henry.

A trained medical doctor who, with the support of his wife Eliza, helped Lincoln and his wife-to-be Mary Todd through their stuttering steps to matrimony, Henry was usually more political than medical in his emphases. He came overland to Oregon in 1852 and quickly plunged into the territory's politics. With an unrelenting penchant for pugnacity, Henry frequently alienated his colleagues by telling them what they should believe and how they should vote.

In the late 1850s Henry and Lincoln exchanged remarkable letters overflowing with information on national and Oregon politics. A few days after his loss to Douglas in the senatorial race of 1858, Lincoln wrote to Henry, saying "I am glad I made the late race...and though I now sink out of view, and shall be forgotten, I believe I made some marks which will tell for the cause

of civil liberty long after I am gone." A few weeks later Henry assured the disappointed Lincoln that he had "achieved a most glorious triumph" and would not sink out of sight "as you seem to anticipate, nor will you be forgotten."<sup>17</sup>

The following summer Henry wrote to update his Illinois friend on the political circuses in the Oregon Country. He predicted, and was partially correct, that the next summer (1860) Oregon would elect "an out and out Republican and a Popular Sovereignty Democrat," which would keep proslavery Democrat Joseph "Lane and an other [sic] Southern Toady" out of the senate. If the political cards fell right, Oregon "would go for you [Lincoln] at any time." These candid, supportive, and biased comments from distant Oregon from Lincoln's political doctor continued over the next half-dozen years.<sup>18</sup>

The third Lincoln friend moving to Oregon, Simeon Francis, arrived on the West Coast in late 1859, just in time to put Lincoln's Republican candidacy before Oregon voters. Francis and his wife Eliza had been close to Lincoln, opening their home to him and Mary Todd when their courtship seemed to be floundering and helping the couple find their way back to friendship and marriage.

In early 1860 Francis enthusiastically promoted Lincoln for the Republican nomination. In providing the first widely circulated account of Lincoln in the Republican *Oregon Argus*, Francis did much to introduce Lincoln to Oregon Republicans who had thus far backed Missourian Edward Bates and New York Senator William Seward for the presidency. Soon thereafter Francis became editor of the Portland *Daily Oregonian*, where he continued to plug Lincoln in the leading Republican newspaper in the Pacific Northwest.<sup>19</sup>

The fourth of the quartet of Lincoln friends in Oregon, Edward D. Baker, was probably the most influential of these acquaintances. A life-long and close friend of the Lincolns (the Lincolns named their second son Eddie after Baker), he had moved to California in the early 1850s, where he helped to establish the Republican Party and ran unsuccessfully for Congress in a Democratic state. Then David Logan, Dr. Henry, and a handful of other Oregon Republicans urged Baker to move north and run for the U. S. Senate, possibly becoming one of the new state's first senators. An ambitious and

energetic carpetbagger, Baker arrived in Portland in late 1859—just as Francis came—and immediately set out building bridges between Republicans and Stephen Douglas Democrats favoring popular sovereignty.<sup>20</sup> After days of acrimonious debates at a meeting of the state legislature in early fall 1860, the Douglas-Salem Clique Democrats agreed to support Edward Baker for the U. S. Senate if the rising Republicans would back Democrat James W. Nesmith. The bargain was forged, Baker and Democrat James Nesmith wining Senate seats. Both candidates spoke strongly for popular sovereignty.

The quartet of friends and political acquaintances were immensely important personal links for Lincoln with Oregon. They kept him abreast of political crosscurrents in Oregon and promoted his political prospects in the territory and new state. They also helped establish the Republican Party in the Far West, with Baker the first elected Republican from Oregon or California. Their influence was made even clearer in the complex election of 1860 in Oregon.

Few observers thought Lincoln had much of a chance to capture Oregon in the presidential contest of 1860. In fact, some pooh-poohed Lincoln's possible candidacy. Early in the campaign most Oregon Republicans favored Edward Bates of Missouri as their candidate for the presidency. But deep divisions in the national and regional Democratic Party proved to be the major reasons for Lincoln's success in Oregon in 1860. Across the country and in Oregon, Democrats were fractiously divided between Douglas supporters who favored popular sovereignty and proslavery leaders like Joseph Lane of Oregon. The Democrats failed to nominate a candidate in their Charleston, South Carolina, convention in April and then broke into a northern wing nominating Douglas and a southern wing nominating John C. Breckinridge for president and Joseph Lane for vice-president. That huge split also further separated Oregon's Democrats, and Lane's acceptance of the southern wing's nomination on a proslavery ticket alienated pro-Union Democrats in Oregon. These Douglas Democrats were now open to finding common ground with the newer Republican Party.

That common ground was popular sovereignty. Republican leaders like Dr. Henry and the newly arrived Edward Baker accepted popular sovereignty, even though that was not the position of national Republicans or of Abraham Lincoln, who had won the Republican nomination in May 1860. The new marriage of Douglas Democrats and many Republicans around popular sovereignty laid the groundwork for a successful compromise that later brought about the election of Douglas Democrat Nesmith and Republican Baker in the Oregon legislature in September-October 1860.

Undoubtedly the "fusion" compromise on popular sovereignty and the senatorial election success of Nesmith and Baker greatly impacted the presidential election in Oregon in early November 1860. With the much larger Democratic Party badly divided into northern and southern camps, Lincoln sneaked past his opposition in a surprising win. He garnered 5,345 votes, Breckinridge and Lane 5,075, Douglas 4,131, and John Bell of the Constitutional Union party 213. Even Lincoln admitted his victory in Oregon resulted from "the closest political bookkeeping that I know of."<sup>21</sup>

Lincoln's Oregon victory in 1860 turned the tide politically in the new state. Four years later Lincoln won again—with a larger margin—in what had previously been a decidedly Democratic area since its founding. In nearly all the presidential elections in Oregon stretching through 1900, the Republicans were more often victorious than Democrats. One could argue, with good evidence, that Lincoln's wins in 1860 and 1864 made him something of a political founding father for the Republicans in some parts of the American far northwest.

\* \* \* \* \*

Once Lincoln was ensconced in the White House, his connections with the Oregon Country multiplied and moved in new directions. Lincoln first emphasized the Whig program of internal improvements. But when the controversies over slavery reached a new, fevered pitch in the late 1840s and early 1850s, he, while embracing the Wilmot Proviso with its no extension of slavery into the territories, moved clearly into the antislavery (but not abolitionist) camp. A third stage of Lincoln's connections with the trans-Mississippi West began when he assumed the presidency. He

resurrected his earlier support for internal improvements, married that support to his recent antislavery stances, and advanced both as the chief executive. This new stage revealed itself in the Congressional legislation Lincoln supported, in his patronage decisions for the West, and in his actions on antislavery legislation.

All these moves intensified Lincoln's connections with the Oregon Country. But other kinds of Lincoln links to the Pacific Northwest were being forged.

Lincoln had been a long-time promoter of railroads. He had spoken repeatedly for railroads, which he viewed as a necessary avenue to move farmers and "mechanics" upward and outward in an increasingly market economy. When he entered the White House, his other motivations for encouraging transcontinental railroads included keeping Oregon and California from leaving the Union to form a separate Pacific Republic and tying the West, generally, to the country east of the Mississippi.<sup>22</sup>

As President, Lincoln quickly and easily supported the Pacific Railroad Act (1862). Two years later in 1864, with financiers balking at investing in the railroads, Lincoln urged Congress to double the size of land grants, make more financing available, and charter another transcontinental railroad, the Northern Pacific, stretching across the northern West to the Pacific Coast.

Lincoln's involvement in agricultural matters was even more forthright. Ironically, Lincoln had foresworn farming while still a young man, but as an aspiring politico he realized he could not alienate agriculturists and thus supported the Homestead Act (1862). Knowing of Lincoln's advocacy of a homestead act, some enthusiastic voters walked a gang plank of expectancy by stating that a vote for Lincoln was "a vote for your own farm."

The Homestead Act of 1862 embodied Lincoln's values as well his dream for the future of the West. For most of his countrymen that meant owning arable land. The Homestead Act endeavored to do that by giving bona fide settlers 160 acres of farmable land if they "proved up" (lived on the land) for five years and paid a small registration fee. Lincoln supporters could and did claim him as a "land man," and he envisioned providing virtually free land to worthy settlers and returning veterans.<sup>23</sup>

Earlier as a loyal Whig, and later as a Republican convert, Lincoln also agreed

with the high value the two political parties placed on education. It was not surprising, then, that President Lincoln backed what became the Morrill Land-Grant Act giving 30,000-acre parcels of land to any state equal to the number of their U.S. senators and representatives. Thus, the act provided a minimum of 90,000 acres for all states. The land granted was intended to help establish colleges "to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanical arts."<sup>24</sup> Eventually in the Pacific Northwest, these land grants helped establish Oregon State University, Washington State University, and the University of Idaho.

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The most time-consuming and controversial of Lincoln's connections with the Pacific Northwest, however, were his political patronage appointments in the region from 1861 to 1865. Lincoln was much involved in naming officials in Washington, which became a territory in 1853, and in the new territories organized during his presidency, Idaho (1863) and Montana (1864), less so in Oregon, a state since 1859. Some presidents considered these onerous duties, but Lincoln enjoyed giving positions to relatives, friends, and political contacts.

Some of Lincoln's friends who had moved to the Pacific Northwest from 1849 to 1860 were centrally involved in a few of his appointive decisions in the region. But the importance of those friendly connections changed quickly over time. David Logan dropped from the scene early in Lincoln's administration, Edward (Ned) Baker took his senatorial seat in December 1860 but was killed in a Civil War battle less than a year later, and Simeon Francis also largely disappeared from Lincoln's correspondence after the president named him army paymaster at Ft. Vancouver in 1861.



Edward Baker  
LFA-0178

But the indefatigable—and irascible—Dr. Henry leaped into the political gap. Henry made lists of “acceptable” candidates for territorial posts, denounced opponents (often Democrats), and encouraged Lincoln to follow the good doctor’s suggestions in Pacific Northwest politics. The doctor’s most negative opponents in Illinois and Oregon—and there were more than a few—asserted that he had the personality of a porcupine and the soul of a shark. But Lincoln, who had known Henry for more than thirty years, thought differently. Dr. Henry was, Lincoln told a new Congressman from Oregon, a “great, big-hearted man...one of the best men I have ever known. He sometimes commits an error of judgment, but I never knew him to be guilty of a falsehood or an act beneath a gentleman. He is the soul of truth and honor.”<sup>25</sup>

During his slightly more than four years in the White House, Lincoln may have appointed well over 100 persons to western territories. In each territory presidents were obligated to name at least five officials: a governor, secretary, and three judges. But the Chief Executive might also appoint a superintendent of Indian affairs (if the governor did not also serve in this dual capacity), marshals, and several other lesser officials. That meant in the Oregon Country Lincoln must name at least fifteen territorial officials, five each in the territories of Washington, Idaho, and Montana. Probably Lincoln appointed twenty to twenty-five such officials in these three territories because of resignations, no-shows, and illnesses. Perhaps he named an equal number to other offices and to varied positions in the state of Oregon. All told, Lincoln’s patronage appointments in the Pacific Northwest may have been as high as fifty persons during his administration.<sup>26</sup>

Several difficulties hampered this patronage work. First, the appointees were primarily eastern men, usually lawyers or politicians, who knew little about the Oregon Country. Second, local politicians coveted these appointments and rarely accepted the alien newcomers with open arms. Third, the system led to a huge conflict between eastern appointees and a western populace bent on practicing popular sovereignty, making their own decisions without the outside interference from faraway Washington, D. C. Fourth, financial affairs were complicated. Although Congress paid

the salaries of the five federal officials, that financial support was erratic; in fact, the total costs of maintaining those offices were rarely adequately funded.

Lincoln’s appointments in the three Northwest territories contained few surprises. In 1861, for governor of Washington Territory, Lincoln named William Henson Wallace, who had moved to the territory in 1853 and become active in Whig and then Republican politics. Even before Wallace took the governor’s chair, he was elected territorial delegate to Congress. After Wallace’s elevation to Congress, Lincoln replaced him with William Pickering, an Englishman and a graduate of Oxford, an Illinois politician, and a long-standing friend of the president. No easy times followed for Pickering, with partisan politicians attacking him, even before he arrived as “another Drunkard from Illinois.” He also found himself often at odds with the Democratic-dominated territorial legislature. Pickering’s experiences in Washington Territory were of a piece with those of most Lincoln appointees; they were unable to lead locals, both Democrats and Republicans, who had different agendas in mind than those of “carpetbaggers from the East.”<sup>27</sup>

Dr. Henry, whom Lincoln appointed surveyor general of Washington Territory in June 1861, often led the

partisan charges in that territory, as he had previously in Illinois and Oregon. Henry became the self-appointed Republican ringmaster, even more so, on occasion, than governors Wallace and Pickering. In that vein, Henry wrote Lincoln urging the president to get rid of disloyal Republicans. On the other hand, he sent a glowing letter praising supportive fellow Republicans and a Douglas Democrat.<sup>28</sup>

In the early 1860s interior sections of Washington greatly expanded, largely as a result of new mining booms in present western-central Idaho. Profiting from these strikes and desiring more local power and fewer ties to distant Olympia, residents of Walla Walla, Lewiston, and later Boise began calling for the reorganization of the territory. Again, westerners like Dr. Henry and W. H. Wallace, the latter now the territorial delegate of Washington, encouraged the formation of a new territory incorporating what became Idaho but also mining areas of western Montana. After a good deal of fractious wrangling about borders, Idaho Territory was established in 1863, and Lincoln named Wallace Idaho’s first governor in July 1863. By late October the earlier pattern in Washington Territory repeated itself, with Wallace winning election as Idaho’s initial territorial delegate.



“North Platte”, Drawing by Daniel A. Jenks  
Two covered wagons being ferried across the Platte River in central Wyoming.  
LC-USZC4-8874

But the reasons for Lincoln's appointment of Caleb Lyon of New York as Wallace's gubernatorial replacement remain a mystery. Some think Lyon proved to be Lincoln's worst western territorial appointee. An enigmatic man of poetic interests and innocent of the demands of political leadership, Lyon proceeded to alienate nearly all residents with his foolish and questionable antics. Whether in his attempts to educate uneducated miners to the joys of the classics, in his flamboyant dress, or in his crooked financial dealings, Lyon failed in every regard and soon was gone.<sup>29</sup>

One year later in 1864, continued demographic shifts in the huge, open spaces of the northern West led to the establishment of Montana Territory. Politics played a large role. Republicans hoped to launch the territory, establish their party organization in the new territory, and then move rapidly on to bringing in another Republican state to the Union. Such was the case in 1864 when Montana was carved out of the sprawling Idaho Territory. Again, William H. Wallace pulled necessary wires. He worked hand in hand to organize Montana Territory with Idaho's Chief Justice Sidney Edgerton, who personally saw the difficulties of trying to dispense justice in the Bannack areas of western Montana from faraway, over-the-mountains Idaho. Lincoln, from a list of ten applicants, named Edgerton to be Montana's first governor.<sup>30</sup> Tied down with his multitudinous pressing duties, Lincoln was not much involved in Montana's territorial politics in the less than a year he had to live.

A few patterns emerge in Lincoln's handling of patronage in the territories of Washington, Idaho, and Montana. Nearly all of Lincoln's appointees were former Whigs or current Republicans. Lincoln was, of course, following President Andrew Jackson's dictum of thirty years earlier: to the victor belong the spoils of office. Wallace, Pickering, Lyon, and Edgerton represented the "spoils." Wallace and Edgerton were also lawyers, as were many of Lincoln's appointees in the West. Other appointees were friends of Lincoln or acquaintances of his friends. For example, when Lincoln named Idaho's territorial officials, in addition to Wallace to the governor's chair, John R. McBride of Yamhill County, Oregon (where David Logan and Dr. Henry first resided in the West) became chief

justice. Also named to Idaho positions were Territorial Secretary William B. Daniels of Oregon's Yamhill, brother-in-law of McBride, and Judge Alleck C. Smith, Anson G. Henry's son-in-law. These boxed-in appointments led to much criticism. Lincoln's appointees were sometimes castigated as "The Tribe of Abraham," carpetbaggers, or still another of Lincoln's lawyer friends.<sup>31</sup>

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Lincoln's support for legislation emanating out of Congress and his patronage appointments were major connections with the Oregon Country, but they were not the whole story. Although the involvements were less numerous and less direct, Lincoln also had his hand in determinations about Indian affairs and military decisions. Even though the war east of the Mississippi and political challenges in Washington, D. C., devoured most of his time and energies, Lincoln still managed to put at least his fingerprints on other actions in the Pacific Northwest.

In one of these areas, Indian policy, Lincoln had little knowledge or experience. He had minimal contact with Indians before and during his White House years. Generally, as president he left the troubling complexities of Indian policy-making in the hands of the energetic William P. Dole, a political appointee and friend who served as Indian commissioner throughout Lincoln's administration. Yet a few events involving Indians affairs forced themselves on the president, and more than one involved the Oregon Country.<sup>32</sup>

Lincoln's dealings with Indian affairs in the PNW reveal no well-thought-out plan. Rather, the happenings were a potpourri of rather unrelated events. The president sent treaties made with Oregon Country Natives to the U.S. Senate without commenting on them (his usual practice), he wrestled with naming or removing superintendents of Indians in the Northwest territories (especially in Washington), and he received negative reports about rascals ripping off Indians (without commenting on these negative reports). But the president was too much a bystander, an onlooker, in dealing with Indians. Here was a leader who promised to reform an unsavory Indian system but who seemed disinclined or unable to devote the necessary time to instigate those needed reforms.<sup>33</sup>

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In other areas dealing with the Oregon Country, Lincoln was more actively involved, including challenges to the Union from secessionists and pro-South advocates. As rumors about dissenters spread, Lincoln set out to make sure that anti-Unionists did not separate California and Oregon from the U. S. to form a separate Pacific Republic. He also urged state and territorial leaders in the Oregon Country to combat the ex-Confederates who had moved to the region and who were fomenting disruption. Finally, he looked for ways to safeguard settlers of the Northwest after U. S. military forces stationed there were shipped east to battle against the South. These general and specific goals gradually evolved, sometimes in hesitant and chaotic form.<sup>34</sup>

In Oregon, supporters of the Union mistakenly attacked pro-South advocate Joseph Lane as the leader of the separationists. In Washington Territory, rumors circulated that bands of men were organizing a force to overthrow the government, take control, and separate the territory from the Union. No major leader or large contingent of voters in the Northwest came out forcefully for a Pacific Republic, but worries about such threats continued well into the Civil War years.<sup>35</sup> Clearly, the worrisome rumors added to the challenges Lincoln faced in the Oregon Country and obviously influenced federal policies toward dissenters in the region.

Once Lincoln was elected and even before he entered the White House, pro-Southern advocates, nationally as well as in the Oregon Country, turned their big guns of criticism on him. They denounced him as an abolitionist, a Black Republican, and one who would attack slavery. In the Northwest some backers of the new Confederacy joined secret societies such as the Knights of the Golden Circle, others refused to support the Union, and still others happily condemned anyone who criticized the South. When rhetoric reached red hot level, the proslavery and antiwar Democrats were denounced as Copperheads, as "Secesh," and sometimes as "traitors."<sup>36</sup>

Support for the Confederacy bubbled up even more strongly in the Idaho and Montana territories. The first two territorial governors, William H. Wallace and Caleb Lyon, were Republicans, appointed by Lincoln. But Democrats in Idaho were in the majority in 1863 and beyond, electing

Democrats to their territorial legislature. So strong was the Copperhead contingent that when a Republican-appointed judge tried to hold court in the outlying mining boomtown of Florence, a grand jury "promptly indicted Lincoln, the cabinet, several army officers, and the judge himself."<sup>37</sup> Although in 1864 Lincoln thought the rife dissension in Idaho was beginning to melt away, Governor Lyon did not. He agreed with a West Coast military officer that a "strong Anti Union feeling exist[ed] throughout the Pacific Slope." "An influx of desperate characters driven from the rule of law and order," Lyon continued, was also "strong in this [Idaho] territory."<sup>38</sup> Lyon's inability to deal with these divisive political issues and those who dissented eventually led to the quick end of his stay in Idaho.

The civil war of politics and North-South conflicts spilled over into Montana. It was especially difficult for new territories such as Idaho and Montana, for they were born into the territorial world, in the swaddling clothes of controversy. Montana even more so than Idaho. Large numbers of Missourians, for example, had moved into Montana, bringing with them a cast of mind favoring the South. Even though the impact of these southerners or Doughfaces (that is, northerners with southern sympathies), was exaggerated when they were derisively called Copperheads and traitors, they were, nonetheless, opponents of the Republicans, particularly the appointees Lincoln sent in from the East. The dissenters also pointed to Lincoln's crackdown on dissent as excessive, as actions that must be opposed. But one Republican leader and a strong Unionist was surely misstating the truth when he warned that the "left wing" of Confederate General Sterling Price's army from Missouri was "skulking in the gulches of Montana, inciting treason."<sup>39</sup>

Obviously the bitter sectional quarrels dividing the Union had lapped over into Montana. But the heated partisan politics of both Republicans and Democrats rose above the boiling point in the new territory. Shortly after Lincoln's death, less than a year after Montana had been organized and Edgerton began his administration, the territory wobbled on the edge of collapse because it could not find a way to resolve its political differences, especially under the governor's misguided leadership.

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Over time Lincoln's essential noninvolvement in military affairs paralleled his separation from Indian policies in the Oregon Country. Still, bit by bit Lincoln made clear his goals for military activity from the Mississippi River west. First, he wanted to keep the Confederacy from advancing west through New Mexico and Arizona and on to California to capture its much-needed ports and its rich minerals. He also hoped to divide the South into eastern and western parts by freeing the Mississippi River from Confederate control stretching from Illinois to New Orleans. If need be, he would also invade Louisiana and Texas to make certain this important division occurred.

None of these plans had a major impact on the Pacific Northwest, but other military determinations did influence the area. Most often these decisions dealt with keeping dissenters under control, making certain the West Coast did not secede from the Union, dealing with settlers' complaints about and conflicts with Indians, and guarding the overland trails as they entered the Oregon Country. Even in these areas, the footprints of Lincoln's presence were sometimes a bit indistinct.<sup>40</sup>

Even though Lincoln's long arms did not reach out to specifically direct the military in the Pacific Northwest, the actions of military leaders and soldiers there were of a piece with his plans for the West. Even before he entered the White House, Lincoln made clear that he thought of the West as a fertile ground for agriculture and mining; those views solidified further once he became president. That meant the West, including the Oregon Country, must be kept in the Union, safe from secessionist dreams of separation; and settlers and miners must be protected from Indians who might react to white invasion of their hunting grounds and living areas.<sup>41</sup>

Brig. Gen. Edwin V. Sumner, who came west to become the new commander of the Department of the Pacific in April 1861, set in motion actions to protect the Union and its facilities, trying not to alienate those who questioned Lincoln's war policies. Among Sumner's quick actions was to bring Army Regulars from the Northwest to protect threatened Union sites in California and Nevada. Very soon public opinion swung toward the Union, and the secessionists lost a good deal of their support. The new departmental commander also began to call for volunteers, and as soon as they arrived he sent some east to protect the

overland trails leading into Oregon and California.<sup>42</sup>

Meanwhile, the Lincoln administration made decisions to help Sumner carry out its goals in the Pacific Northwest and California. When Governor John Whiteaker of Oregon refused to help with the recruitment of needed troops, Lincoln's Secretary of War Simon Cameron allowed Senator Baker to do his own recruiting. Baker's enthusiastic efforts led to a California regiment of more than 600 members.<sup>43</sup> In addition, Lincoln chose not to enforce the draft on the West Coast, including Oregon, because in doing so he could more likely avoid controversies and achieve his retention and protection goals.

Fortunately for Lincoln and his military men on the West Coast, conflicts with Indians in the Pacific Northwest were less numerous and less violent in the Civil War years than they had been in the 1850s and would be after war's end. True, the flood of miners into Washington, Idaho, and Montana regions who overran Indian lands, fouled their water sources, and damaged their grazing areas, upset white-Indian relations; but those upsets did not break out into war until later. Still, something had to be done, so in 1863 Lincoln's appointee to the Indian superintendency in Washington Territory, Calvin Hale, moved to negotiate a new treaty with the Nez Perce. It was a ticklish, tense situation, so Hale had six companies of troops from nearby Fort Lapwai stand by as the difficult negotiations were carried out and signed by the "treaty Indians" but not by other Nez Perce, including old Chief Joseph.<sup>44</sup>



Chief Joseph used by permission of the Western History/Genealogy Department, Denver Public Library

Only one huge military conflict with Indians, the Bear River battle (January 1863) occurred during the Civil War years in the Oregon Country. The conflict was, in part, a result of the military's mission to protect settlers and immigrants on the overland trails into the Pacific Northwest. Rambunctious Brig. Gen. Patrick Edward Conner was sent from California to look into rumors that the Mormons were being disloyal to the Union. When he arrived in Salt Lake City in late 1862, he heard numerous stories of Shoshoni Indians attacking settlers and stealing their cattle, their harassments of traders traveling to the newly opened Montana mines, and their intercepting of immigrant trains on the overland trails. On the freezing day of 29 January, Connor's 260 men surrounded and attacked Bear Hunter's Shoshonis near present-day Preston, Idaho. After four hours of intense fighting in which 224 Indians were killed and 160 women and children taken, the soldiers had won one of the most disastrous battles for Indians in the American West. The horrendous engagement also suggested that Lincoln's policy of protecting settlers from Indians, if in the hands of a brutal leader like Conner, could lead to a virtual massacre of Native Americans.<sup>45</sup>

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As the election of 1864 loomed on the horizon, Lincoln was more and more gloomy about his prospects and worried much about not being reelected. As the summer months wore on, Lincoln was mentally preparing himself for losing the election and having to work assiduously with his successor for a smooth transition in administrations. He even wrote out a memo in August 1864 to that effect. When Gen. William T. Sherman telegraphed the president in early September to announce the joyous news of Atlanta's fall, the cloud of despondency disappeared overnight. Now, on to the fall elections to take on George McClellan, Lincoln's erstwhile Union forces commander and the Democratic candidate. Lincoln won fairly easily, especially considering his much closer election in the complex political bloodbath in 1860.

But what about the Oregon Country? How did Lincoln fare there? In some ways the election could be viewed as a test case for Lincoln's leadership and popularity. He had won in Oregon in 1860, much as he had nationally, because of the Democratic split. Would he be able, now, to rally support for his

Union party and its push to end the war?

On first blush, Lincoln fared very well in the election of 1864. In Oregon, still the only part of the Pacific Northwest allowed to participate in the runoff, Lincoln garnered 9,888 votes of the 18,345 votes cast, meaning that he won roughly 54 percent of the vote, with McClellan receiving 8,457, or 46 percent, of the votes. The Lincoln victory takes on larger meaning when it is recalled that Lincoln won only 36 percent of the vote and by just 270 votes in 1860. Lincoln's margin of victory had jumped 18 percent in four years.<sup>46</sup>

Still, the election of 1864 had mixed results for Lincoln. In the new state of Oregon, Lincoln and the Republicans (or the Union Party in 1864) won unexpected presidential elections in 1860 and 1864 in what had been a strongly Democratic territory and state to that point. The Republicans had exploded from a nonexistent political group in the mid-1850s to a party that could and did win presidential elections in the next ten years. They did not stay on top, however; the Democrats reunited and more than duplicated Republican successes after war's end. And if the perspective were pushed ahead to the end of the century, the Republican Party in the 1890s had transformed itself. It was no longer the "Western, radical, agrarian organ" of Lincoln's time, in the words of a perceptive historian; it had become "an Eastern, conservative, industrial and financial organ."<sup>47</sup>

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In late April of 1865 newspapers across the Oregon Country headlined the tragic story of Lincoln's assassination. In the following weeks and months residents of the Pacific Northwest experienced the tides of grief that swept over the entire country after the tragic death of the sixteenth president. As the grieving subsided, a few thoughtful citizens of the Far Corner began to think about the legacy of Abraham Lincoln in the region.

Lincoln's connections, over time, with Pacific Northwest reveal both typical and novel facets about his career. Like most Whigs and Republicans of his time, he was not a strong advocate of expansionism. On the other hand, Lincoln sided with many northern Whigs and later moderate Republicans in advocating the Wilmot Proviso and its no-extension-of-slavery principle. That Lincoln was a strong believer in utilizing

all the patronage power of the presidency is illustrated in his numerous appointments of friends and political associates once he entered the White House. Nor is his push for a transcontinental railroad, a homestead act, and agricultural education enactment surprising since those measures had been popular with Whigs and Republicans for several years. Also as president, Lincoln's hesitations about pushing hard for reform of the Indian Service were similar to his reluctance to move quickly on the emancipation of slaves in the South.

But there were unusual ingredients, too, in Lincoln's links with the Oregon Country. Once several of his friends moved to Oregon in the dozen years before his election to the presidency, Lincoln became more connected personally with the territory and later state of Oregon than with any other territory or state in the trans-Mississippi West. The outcomes of the elections of 1860 and 1864 in Oregon were surprising, too, since the area had been Democratic from its beginnings. Lincoln's Republican political appointments in the territory of Washington and in the new territories of Idaho and Montana, as well as a few in the state of Oregon, although similar to the appointive traditions of several earlier presidents, nonetheless reveal path-breaking qualities about Lincoln's role as a political figure: he became a political founding father in the Northwest as well as in other parts of the American West. He was obviously the most important figure in launching the Republican Party in these far-flung sections of this sprawling region.

Another and final significance stands out: even in the midst of an all-engrossing war like no other an American president has faced, Abraham Lincoln placed his fingerprints on more than a few ideas and actions that shaped the Oregon Country. He was clearly more than an isolated, uninterested spectator to happenings in the Pacific Northwest.

1. This essay is based on Richard W. Etulain, *Abraham Lincoln and Oregon Country Politics in the Civil War Era*, forthcoming. It also draws on without merely repeating Etulain, ed., *Lincoln Looks West: From the Mississippi to the Pacific* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2010).
2. The best source for understanding Douglas's leading role in expansion into the American West is Robert W. Johannsen's thorough biography, *Stephen A. Douglas* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1973).
3. Earl Schenck Miers, ed., *Lincoln Day by Day: A Chronology 1809-1865* (1860; Dayton, OH: Morningside, 1991), 1: 8-9 February 1843, p. 200; 5 June 1845, p. 252.
4. Roy P. Basler et al., eds., *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1953-1955), 1: 382 (hereafter CW).
5. Kenneth J. Winkle, *The Young Eagle: The Rise of Abraham Lincoln* (Dallas, TX: Taylor Trade, 2001), 202, 238.
6. Earlier historians argued that Lincoln lost Whig support and alienated most of the party in Illinois with his antiwar statements, but more recent historians provide stronger evidence that most Illinois Whigs were not upset with Lincoln's antiwar statements. For two of these more recent views, see Gabor S. Boritt, "A Question of Political Suicide? Lincoln's Opposition to the Mexican War," *Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society* 67 (February 1974): 79-100, and Mark Neely, Jr., "Lincoln and the Mexican War: An Argument by Analogy," *Civil War History* 24 (March 1978): 5-24.
7. CW, 2:323.
8. The documents revealing these two offers to Lincoln are reprinted in CW, 2: 61-67, and Roy P. Basler and Christian O. Basler, eds., *The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, 2nd Supplement, 1848-1865* (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1990), 2-6.
9. For a recent and thorough discussion of Lincoln's reactions to the Oregon offers, see Michael Burlingame, *Abraham Lincoln: A Life, 2 vols.* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008). The online version of Chapter 8, pp. 899-90, contains additional information not available in the published version. See, <http://www.knox.edu/Academics/Distinctive-Programs/Lincoln-Studies-Center/Burlingame-Abraham-Lincoln-A-Life.html>
10. CW, 3:512.
11. The classic account of Lincoln in these years is Don E. Fehrenbacher, *Prelude to Greatness: Lincoln in the 1850's* (1962; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964). Michael S. Green provides a stimulating, succinct discussion of the same period in "Lincoln, the West, and the Antislavery Politics of the 1850s," in Etulain, *Lincoln Looks West*, 90-112.
12. For an extensive examination of Lincoln's Peoria speech, consult Lewis E. Lehman, *Lincoln at Peoria: The Turning Point* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2008). The full text of the speech appears in CW, 2: 247-83.
13. The best source on politics in Oregon in the late 1850s and 1860s is Robert W. Johannsen, *Frontier Politics on the Eve of the Civil War* (1955; Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1967).
14. The following pages on Lincoln's four friends in Oregon draw on Etulain, "Lincoln's links to a distant Oregon," *Portland Oregonian*, 18 February 2008, and Etulain, "Abraham Lincoln: Political Founding Father of the American West," *Montana: The Magazine of Western History* 59 (summer 2009): 3-22.
15. Logan's letters to his sister Mary in Illinois are reprinted in Harry E. Pratt, ed., "22 Letters of David Logan, Pioneer Oregon Lawyer," *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 44 (September 1943): 254-85. See also David Alan Johnson, *Founding the Far West: California, Oregon, and Nevada, 1840-1890* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 167-72, 288-92.
16. David Logan to Abraham Lincoln, 15 September 1861, Lincoln Collection, Henry E. Huntington Library, San Marino, CA.
17. Harry C. Blair, *Dr. Anson G. Henry: Physician, Politician, Friend of Abraham Lincoln* (Portland, OR: Binford and Mort, 1950), and Paul M. Zall, "Dr. Anson G. Henry (1804-65): Lincoln's Junkyard Dog," in Etulain, *Lincoln Looks West*, 174-88; CW, 3:339; Anson G. Henry to Abraham Lincoln, 16 February 1859, Abraham Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress (ALP), available online at <http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/alhtml/alhome.html>.
18. Anson G. Henry to Lincoln, Sunday, 17 July 1859, ALP.
19. Oregon City Oregon Argus, 11 February 1860. See also, CW, 4 August 1860, 4: 89-90.
20. Richard W. Etulain, "Edward D. Baker (1811-1861)," [http://www.oregonencyclopedia.org/entry/view/baker\\_edward\\_1811\\_1861/](http://www.oregonencyclopedia.org/entry/view/baker_edward_1811_1861/)
21. Milton H. Shutes, "Colonel E. D. Baker," *California Historical Society Quarterly* 17 (December 1938): 316.
22. The two best sources on Lincoln and congressional legislation dealing with the West are Heather Cox Richardson, *The Greatest Nation of the Earth: Republican Economic Policies during the Civil War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1997), and Leonard P. Curry, *Blueprint for Modern America: Nonmilitary Legislation of the First Civil War Congress* (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 1968).
23. Gabor S. Boritt, *Lincoln and the Economics of the American Dream* (1978; Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1994), chapters 14 and 15.
24. Quoted in Phillip Shaw Paludan, "A People's Contest": *The Union and the Civil War 1861-1865* (New York: Harper & Row, 1988), 132.
25. Zall, "Dr. Anson G. Henry...: Lincoln's Junkyard Dog"; Lincoln's quote from Harry Edward Pratt, "Dr. Anson G. Henry, Lincoln's Physician and Friend," Part II, *Lincoln Herald* 45 (December 1943): 34.
26. Lists of nearly all of the western territorial appointees are available in Earl S. Pomeroy, *The Territories and the United States 1861-1890: A Study in Colonial Administration* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1947), 110-49, and Elvin L. Valentine, "The American Territorial Governor" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, 1928).
27. William L. Lang, *Confederacy of Ambition: William Winlock Miller and the Making of Washington Territory* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1996); William Pickering to Lincoln, 10 February 1864, ALP.
28. Anson G. Henry to Lincoln, 17 October 1862, Henry Collection, Abraham Lincoln Presidential Library, Springfield, IL (ALPL).
29. Ronald H. Limbaugh, *Rocky Mountain Carpetbaggers: Idaho's Territorial Governors 1863-1890* (Moscow: University Press of Idaho, 1982), chapters 2 and 3; Merle Wells, "Idaho and the Civil War," *Rendezvous* 11 (fall 1976): 9-26.
30. Clark C. Spence, *Territorial Politics and Government in Montana 1864-89* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1975); CW, 7: 371, 403.
31. Robert W. Johannsen, "The Tribe of Abraham: Lincoln and the Washington Territory," in David H. Stratton, ed., *Washington Comes of Age: The State in the National Experience* (Pullman: Washington State University Press, 1992), 73-93.
32. The most thorough study of this subject is David A. Nichols, *Lincoln and the Indians: Civil War Policy and Politics* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1978).
33. CW, 7: 112-13; 8: 322; Dr. Henry to Lincoln, 3 February 1862, ALP.
34. Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., *The Civil War in the American West* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1992).
35. Robert W. Johannsen, "The Secession Crisis and the Frontier: Washington Territory, 1860-61," in Johannsen, *The Frontier, the Union, and Stephen A. Douglas* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989), 42-44; James E. Hendrickson, *Joe Lane of Oregon: Machine Politics and the Sectional Crisis* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1967), 248-49.
36. Jeff LaLande, "Dixie' of the Pacific Northwest: Southern Oregon's Civil War," *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 100 (spring 1999): 32-81, and G. Thomas Edwards, "Six Oregon Leaders and the Far-Reaching Impact of America's Civil War," *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 100 (spring 1999): 4-31.
37. Limbaugh, *Rocky Mountain Carpetbaggers*, 20.
38. Governor Caleb Lyon to Secretary of State William H. Seward, 10 August 1864, quoted in Merle Wells, "Idaho and the Civil War," *Rendezvous* 11 (fall 1976): 9-26, quote on p. 20.
39. Quoted in K. Ross Toole, *Montana: An Uncommon Land* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1949), 98-99.
40. The best overview on these topics is Josephy, *The Civil War in the American West*.
41. Eric Foner, *Free Soil, Free Labor, Free Men: The Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1970).
42. G. Thomas Edwards, "Holding the Far West for the Union: The Army in 1861," *Civil War History* 14 (December 1958): 307-24; Josephy, *Civil War in the West*, 236-38.
43. Harry C. Blair and Rebecca Tarshis, *Lincoln's Constant Ally: The Life of Colonel Edward Baker* (Portland: Oregon Historical Society, 1960), 125.
44. Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., *The Nez Perce Indians and the Opening of the Northwest* (1965; Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997), 415 ff.
45. Josephy, *Civil War in the West*, 251-59; Gregory F. Michno, *Encyclopedia of Indian Wars: Western Battles and Skirmishes, 1850-1890* (Missoula, MT: Mountain Press Publishing Company, 2003), 110-11.
46. Johannsen, *Frontier Politics*, 147.
47. Earl Pomeroy, *The Pacific Slope: A History of California, Oregon, Washington, Idaho, Utah, and Nevada* (1965; Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1973), 78.